A response to fourth generation warfare
Fourth Generation Warfare (4GW) claims that non-state insurgencies are the wave of the future. Furthermore, 4GW is presented as a radically new form of warfare and defeating it thus requires equally radical changes in military organization and thought. This theory is seriously f...
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| 格式: | Working Paper |
| 語言: | English |
| 出版: |
2011
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| 主題: | |
| 在線閱讀: | https://hdl.handle.net/10356/104462 http://hdl.handle.net/10220/6524 |
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| 總結: | Fourth Generation Warfare (4GW) claims that non-state insurgencies are the wave of
the future. Furthermore, 4GW is presented as a radically new form of warfare and
defeating it thus requires equally radical changes in military organization and thought.
This theory is seriously flawed because it says nothing new, exaggerates the
characteristics of insurgency and suffers from bad history. Proponents of 4GW such
as Martin van Creveld and Thomas X. Hammes inaccurately distinguish insurgency
as “political” and “non-Trinitarian”, when in fact both political will and Clausewitz’s
Trinity are an integral part of all wars. Insurgency is claimed to be the latest
“generation” of warfare. However, a survey of military history shows that warfare did
not develop in four clear “generations”. Furthermore, insurgency is as old as warfare
itself and its principles have been understood since antiquity. 4GW is thus both
inaccurate and unnecessary. We would do well to simply abandon the theory as it is
not the solution to dealing with insurgencies. Military thinkers should instead study
insurgency within the larger context of history if they wish to understand it. |
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