Why do firms in weak institutional environments adopt strong corporate governance? The role of government regulation
This study identifies one potential benefit of mandatory investor protection laws in weak investor protection countries neglected by the extant literature: laws help reduce firms’ bonding costs to strong corporate governance. We argue that corporate insiders (outsiders) have little incentive to volu...
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| 格式: | Theses and Dissertations |
| 語言: | English |
| 出版: |
2015
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| 主題: | |
| 在線閱讀: | http://hdl.handle.net/10356/65376 |
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