Non-zero-sum reinsurance games subject to ambiguous correlations
This paper studies the economic implications of ambiguous correlation in a non-zero-sum game between two insurers. We establish the general framework of Nash equilibrium for the coupled optimization problems. For the constant absolute risk aversion (CARA) insurers, we show that the equilibrium reins...
Saved in:
Main Authors: | , , |
---|---|
其他作者: | |
格式: | Article |
語言: | English |
出版: |
2016
|
主題: | |
在線閱讀: | https://hdl.handle.net/10356/83369 http://hdl.handle.net/10220/41181 |
標簽: |
添加標簽
沒有標簽, 成為第一個標記此記錄!
|
機構: | Nanyang Technological University |
語言: | English |