Do controlling shareholders' expropriation incentives imply a link between corporate governance and firm value? Theory and evidence

We develop and test a model that investigates how controlling shareholders' expropriation incentives affect firm values during crisis and subsequent recovery periods. Consistent with the prediction of our model, we find that, during the 1997 Asian financial crisis, Asian firms with weaker corpo...

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محفوظ في:
التفاصيل البيبلوغرافية
المؤلفون الرئيسيون: Bae, Kee-Hong, Baek, Jae-Seung, Kang, Jun-Koo, Liu, Wei-Lin
مؤلفون آخرون: Nanyang Business School
التنسيق: مقال
اللغة:English
منشور في: 2013
الموضوعات:
الوصول للمادة أونلاين:https://hdl.handle.net/10356/97936
http://hdl.handle.net/10220/18083
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المؤسسة: Nanyang Technological University
اللغة: English
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spelling sg-ntu-dr.10356-979362023-05-19T06:44:41Z Do controlling shareholders' expropriation incentives imply a link between corporate governance and firm value? Theory and evidence Bae, Kee-Hong Baek, Jae-Seung Kang, Jun-Koo Liu, Wei-Lin Nanyang Business School DRNTU::Business::Finance We develop and test a model that investigates how controlling shareholders' expropriation incentives affect firm values during crisis and subsequent recovery periods. Consistent with the prediction of our model, we find that, during the 1997 Asian financial crisis, Asian firms with weaker corporate governance experience a larger drop in their share values but, during the post-crisis recovery period, such firms experience a larger rebound in their share values. We also find consistent evidence for Latin American firms during the 2001 Argentine economic crisis. Our results support the view that controlling shareholders' expropriation incentives imply a link between corporate governance and firm value. 2013-12-05T03:43:05Z 2019-12-06T19:48:32Z 2013-12-05T03:43:05Z 2019-12-06T19:48:32Z 2012 2012 Journal Article Bae, K.-H., Baek, J.-S., Kang, J.-K., & Liu, W.-L. (2012). Do controlling shareholders' expropriation incentives imply a link between corporate governance and firm value? Theory and evidence. Journal of financial economics, 105(2), 412-435. 0304-405X https://hdl.handle.net/10356/97936 http://hdl.handle.net/10220/18083 10.1016/j.jfineco.2012.02.007 en Journal of financial economics
institution Nanyang Technological University
building NTU Library
continent Asia
country Singapore
Singapore
content_provider NTU Library
collection DR-NTU
language English
topic DRNTU::Business::Finance
spellingShingle DRNTU::Business::Finance
Bae, Kee-Hong
Baek, Jae-Seung
Kang, Jun-Koo
Liu, Wei-Lin
Do controlling shareholders' expropriation incentives imply a link between corporate governance and firm value? Theory and evidence
description We develop and test a model that investigates how controlling shareholders' expropriation incentives affect firm values during crisis and subsequent recovery periods. Consistent with the prediction of our model, we find that, during the 1997 Asian financial crisis, Asian firms with weaker corporate governance experience a larger drop in their share values but, during the post-crisis recovery period, such firms experience a larger rebound in their share values. We also find consistent evidence for Latin American firms during the 2001 Argentine economic crisis. Our results support the view that controlling shareholders' expropriation incentives imply a link between corporate governance and firm value.
author2 Nanyang Business School
author_facet Nanyang Business School
Bae, Kee-Hong
Baek, Jae-Seung
Kang, Jun-Koo
Liu, Wei-Lin
format Article
author Bae, Kee-Hong
Baek, Jae-Seung
Kang, Jun-Koo
Liu, Wei-Lin
author_sort Bae, Kee-Hong
title Do controlling shareholders' expropriation incentives imply a link between corporate governance and firm value? Theory and evidence
title_short Do controlling shareholders' expropriation incentives imply a link between corporate governance and firm value? Theory and evidence
title_full Do controlling shareholders' expropriation incentives imply a link between corporate governance and firm value? Theory and evidence
title_fullStr Do controlling shareholders' expropriation incentives imply a link between corporate governance and firm value? Theory and evidence
title_full_unstemmed Do controlling shareholders' expropriation incentives imply a link between corporate governance and firm value? Theory and evidence
title_sort do controlling shareholders' expropriation incentives imply a link between corporate governance and firm value? theory and evidence
publishDate 2013
url https://hdl.handle.net/10356/97936
http://hdl.handle.net/10220/18083
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