Do controlling shareholders' expropriation incentives imply a link between corporate governance and firm value? Theory and evidence

• المؤلفون الرئيسيون: Bae, Kee-Hong, Baek, Jae-Seung, Kang, Jun-Koo, Liu, Wei-Lin
• مؤلفون آخرون: Nanyang Business School
• التنسيق: مقال
• اللغة: English
• منشور في: 2013
• الموضوعات: DRNTU::Business::Finance
• الوصول للمادة أونلاين: https://hdl.handle.net/10356/97936; http://hdl.handle.net/10220/18083

We develop and test a model that investigates how controlling shareholders' expropriation incentives affect firm values during crisis and subsequent recovery periods. Consistent with the prediction of our model, we find that, during the 1997 Asian financial crisis, Asian firms with weaker corpo...