The Inefficiency of Quasi–Per Se Rules: Regulating Information Exchange in EU and U.S. Antitrust Law
10.1111/ablj.12155
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sg-nus-scholar.10635-1658062024-04-05T07:43:40Z The Inefficiency of Quasi–Per Se Rules: Regulating Information Exchange in EU and U.S. Antitrust Law Khoo, Kenneth Soh, Jerold LAW 10.1111/ablj.12155 American Business Law Journal 57 1 45-111 2020-03-20T02:31:36Z 2020-03-20T02:31:36Z 2020-03 2020-03-19T19:45:48Z Article Khoo, Kenneth, Soh, Jerold (2020-03). The Inefficiency of Quasi–Per Se Rules: Regulating Information Exchange in EU and U.S. Antitrust Law. American Business Law Journal 57 (1) : 45-111. ScholarBank@NUS Repository. https://doi.org/10.1111/ablj.12155 0002-7766 1744-1714 https://scholarbank.nus.edu.sg/handle/10635/165806 Wiley Elements |
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10.1111/ablj.12155 |
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LAW Khoo, Kenneth Soh, Jerold |
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Article |
author |
Khoo, Kenneth Soh, Jerold |
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Khoo, Kenneth Soh, Jerold The Inefficiency of Quasi–Per Se Rules: Regulating Information Exchange in EU and U.S. Antitrust Law |
author_sort |
Khoo, Kenneth |
title |
The Inefficiency of Quasi–Per Se Rules: Regulating Information Exchange in EU and U.S. Antitrust Law |
title_short |
The Inefficiency of Quasi–Per Se Rules: Regulating Information Exchange in EU and U.S. Antitrust Law |
title_full |
The Inefficiency of Quasi–Per Se Rules: Regulating Information Exchange in EU and U.S. Antitrust Law |
title_fullStr |
The Inefficiency of Quasi–Per Se Rules: Regulating Information Exchange in EU and U.S. Antitrust Law |
title_full_unstemmed |
The Inefficiency of Quasi–Per Se Rules: Regulating Information Exchange in EU and U.S. Antitrust Law |
title_sort |
inefficiency of quasi–per se rules: regulating information exchange in eu and u.s. antitrust law |
publisher |
Wiley |
publishDate |
2020 |
url |
https://scholarbank.nus.edu.sg/handle/10635/165806 |
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1800913931095506944 |