The Inefficiency of Quasi–Per Se Rules: Regulating Information Exchange in EU and U.S. Antitrust Law

10.1111/ablj.12155

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Main Authors: Khoo, Kenneth, Soh, Jerold
Other Authors: LAW
Format: Article
Published: Wiley 2020
Online Access:https://scholarbank.nus.edu.sg/handle/10635/165806
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Institution: National University of Singapore
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spelling sg-nus-scholar.10635-1658062024-04-05T07:43:40Z The Inefficiency of Quasi–Per Se Rules: Regulating Information Exchange in EU and U.S. Antitrust Law Khoo, Kenneth Soh, Jerold LAW 10.1111/ablj.12155 American Business Law Journal 57 1 45-111 2020-03-20T02:31:36Z 2020-03-20T02:31:36Z 2020-03 2020-03-19T19:45:48Z Article Khoo, Kenneth, Soh, Jerold (2020-03). The Inefficiency of Quasi–Per Se Rules: Regulating Information Exchange in EU and U.S. Antitrust Law. American Business Law Journal 57 (1) : 45-111. ScholarBank@NUS Repository. https://doi.org/10.1111/ablj.12155 0002-7766 1744-1714 https://scholarbank.nus.edu.sg/handle/10635/165806 Wiley Elements
institution National University of Singapore
building NUS Library
continent Asia
country Singapore
Singapore
content_provider NUS Library
collection ScholarBank@NUS
description 10.1111/ablj.12155
author2 LAW
author_facet LAW
Khoo, Kenneth
Soh, Jerold
format Article
author Khoo, Kenneth
Soh, Jerold
spellingShingle Khoo, Kenneth
Soh, Jerold
The Inefficiency of Quasi–Per Se Rules: Regulating Information Exchange in EU and U.S. Antitrust Law
author_sort Khoo, Kenneth
title The Inefficiency of Quasi–Per Se Rules: Regulating Information Exchange in EU and U.S. Antitrust Law
title_short The Inefficiency of Quasi–Per Se Rules: Regulating Information Exchange in EU and U.S. Antitrust Law
title_full The Inefficiency of Quasi–Per Se Rules: Regulating Information Exchange in EU and U.S. Antitrust Law
title_fullStr The Inefficiency of Quasi–Per Se Rules: Regulating Information Exchange in EU and U.S. Antitrust Law
title_full_unstemmed The Inefficiency of Quasi–Per Se Rules: Regulating Information Exchange in EU and U.S. Antitrust Law
title_sort inefficiency of quasi–per se rules: regulating information exchange in eu and u.s. antitrust law
publisher Wiley
publishDate 2020
url https://scholarbank.nus.edu.sg/handle/10635/165806
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