Three essays on random mechanism design

• المؤلف الرئيسي: ZENG, Huaxia
• التنسيق: text
• اللغة: English
• منشور في: Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University 2016
• الموضوعات: random social choice functions; strategy-proofness; random dictatorship; compromise; single-peakedness; The Tops-only property; Economics; Economic Theory
• الوصول للمادة أونلاين: https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/etd_coll/129; https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1128&context=etd_coll

This dissertation studies a standard voting formulation with randomization. Formally, there is a finite set of voters, a finite set of alternatives and a lottery space over the alternative set. Each voter has a strict preference over alternatives. The domain of preferences contains all admissible pr...