Advertising Collusion in Retail Markets
We analyze non-price advertising by retail firms, when the firms are privately informed about their respective costs of production. In a static advertising game, an advertising equilibrium exists in which lower-cost firms select higher advertising levels. In this equilibrium, informed consumers rati...
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| Main Authors: | , |
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| Format: | text |
| Language: | English |
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Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University
2010
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| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soe_research/1173 https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/context/soe_research/article/2172/viewcontent/bejeap.2010.10.1.2489.pdf |
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| Institution: | Singapore Management University |
| Language: | English |