Reinterpreting King Solomon's Problem: Malice and Mechanism Design

• المؤلف الرئيسي: GUHA, Brishti
• التنسيق: text
• اللغة: English
• منشور في: Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University 2014
• الموضوعات: King Solomon's problem; Mechanism design; Malice; Elimination of dominated strategies; Behavioral Economics
• الوصول للمادة أونلاين: https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soe_research/1527; https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/context/soe_research/article/2526/viewcontent/ReinterpretingKingSolomonProblem_2014_JEBO.pdf

I argue for an alternative interpretation of King Solomon's problem in terms of one of the two claimants being “malicious”. A “malicious” claimant places no intrinsic value on the object but derives utility from depriving the rival claimant. This new interpretation permits a simpler solution th...