TIMING AND SIMPLE POWER ANALYSIS ATTACK ON A FPGA IMPLEMENTATION OF AN ELLIPTIC CURVE CRYPTOSYSTEM
This report explain elliptic curve cryptography (ECC) processor with 158 bits private key, to process Q = k*P. And also explain timing and simple power analysis attacks (SPA) on a FPGA implementation of an elliptic curve processor. Elliptic Curve Cryptography is a complex, efficient and fast cryp...
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id-itb.:124082017-09-27T10:18:47ZTIMING AND SIMPLE POWER ANALYSIS ATTACK ON A FPGA IMPLEMENTATION OF AN ELLIPTIC CURVE CRYPTOSYSTEM ZULKIFLI, MUCHAMMAD Indonesia Final Project Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC), simple power analysis attack (SPA), timing attack, side channel attack INSTITUT TEKNOLOGI BANDUNG https://digilib.itb.ac.id/gdl/view/12408 This report explain elliptic curve cryptography (ECC) processor with 158 bits private key, to process Q = k*P. And also explain timing and simple power analysis attacks (SPA) on a FPGA implementation of an elliptic curve processor. Elliptic Curve Cryptography is a complex, efficient and fast cryptography for hardware implementation. Elliptic curve cryptography has been implemented in embedded and mobile applications. In this research elliptic curve processor is implemented using DE1 board Altera Cyclone® II tipe EP2C20F484C7. For hardware implementation, Elliptic curve cryptography radiate some new information (side effect, such as timing, power consumption, and electromagnetic radiation) that can be detected using side channel attack, attacking method from hardware. Side channel attack can be observed from timing and power consumption that is needed for cryptography process. This analysis process is important for access vulnerable information from unprotected processor. Process timing attack can predict the possibility of private key contained in the given ECC processor architecture. SPA attack on an unprotected implementation can find the private key with simple measurement and observation. Side-channel attack speed up the process of finding private key of the elliptic curve cryptography. The results of research, used a private key (158 bits) with a 76 bit value 1. The process of brute-force without the side-channel attack requires 2157 process. By timing attack requires 9.95E+45 process (reduced until 5.44% of the total process without timing attack). With simple power analysis had 100% to get the key value. text |
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This report explain elliptic curve cryptography (ECC) processor with 158 bits private key, to
process Q = k*P. And also explain timing and simple power analysis attacks (SPA) on a FPGA
implementation of an elliptic curve processor. Elliptic Curve Cryptography is a complex,
efficient and fast cryptography for hardware implementation. Elliptic curve cryptography has
been implemented in embedded and mobile applications. In this research elliptic curve processor
is implemented using DE1 board Altera Cyclone® II tipe EP2C20F484C7.
For hardware implementation, Elliptic curve cryptography radiate some new information (side
effect, such as timing, power consumption, and electromagnetic radiation) that can be detected
using side channel attack, attacking method from hardware. Side channel attack can be observed
from timing and power consumption that is needed for cryptography process. This analysis
process is important for access vulnerable information from unprotected processor.
Process timing attack can predict the possibility of private key contained in the given ECC
processor architecture. SPA attack on an unprotected implementation can find the private key
with simple measurement and observation.
Side-channel attack speed up the process of finding private key of the elliptic curve
cryptography. The results of research, used a private key (158 bits) with a 76 bit value 1. The
process of brute-force without the side-channel attack requires 2157 process. By timing attack
requires 9.95E+45 process (reduced until 5.44% of the total process without timing attack). With
simple power analysis had 100% to get the key value. |
format |
Final Project |
author |
ZULKIFLI, MUCHAMMAD |
spellingShingle |
ZULKIFLI, MUCHAMMAD TIMING AND SIMPLE POWER ANALYSIS ATTACK ON A FPGA IMPLEMENTATION OF AN ELLIPTIC CURVE CRYPTOSYSTEM |
author_facet |
ZULKIFLI, MUCHAMMAD |
author_sort |
ZULKIFLI, MUCHAMMAD |
title |
TIMING AND SIMPLE POWER ANALYSIS ATTACK ON A FPGA IMPLEMENTATION OF AN ELLIPTIC CURVE CRYPTOSYSTEM |
title_short |
TIMING AND SIMPLE POWER ANALYSIS ATTACK ON A FPGA IMPLEMENTATION OF AN ELLIPTIC CURVE CRYPTOSYSTEM |
title_full |
TIMING AND SIMPLE POWER ANALYSIS ATTACK ON A FPGA IMPLEMENTATION OF AN ELLIPTIC CURVE CRYPTOSYSTEM |
title_fullStr |
TIMING AND SIMPLE POWER ANALYSIS ATTACK ON A FPGA IMPLEMENTATION OF AN ELLIPTIC CURVE CRYPTOSYSTEM |
title_full_unstemmed |
TIMING AND SIMPLE POWER ANALYSIS ATTACK ON A FPGA IMPLEMENTATION OF AN ELLIPTIC CURVE CRYPTOSYSTEM |
title_sort |
timing and simple power analysis attack on a fpga implementation of an elliptic curve cryptosystem |
url |
https://digilib.itb.ac.id/gdl/view/12408 |
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