MAINTENANCE SERVICE CONTRACT MODEL OF DUMPTRUCK IN THE MINING INDUSTRY CONSIDERING OPERATION CONDITION FACTORS (LOAD, ROAD SLOPE, AND ENVIRONMENTAL CONDITION)

• Main Author: NISHFI NIM 23415037, FADHLI
• Format: Theses
• Language: Indonesia
• Online Access: https://digilib.itb.ac.id/gdl/view/27060
• Institution: Institut Teknologi Bandung

Heavy equipment such as dumptruck which is operated in the mining industry will experience degradation with time of use and operating conditions. In the mining industry there are several operating conditions that affect the rate of dumptruck damage, such as load, road slope, and environmental conditions. The dumptruck damage model is modeled with a Proportional Hazard Model (PHM) which considers the factors of operating conditions in addition to age and usage. Maintenance measures are needed to control the ongoing damage so that it can keep the equipment under operating conditions. In this study, heavy equipment such as dumptruck requires action to maintain corrective prevention and maintenance so that equipment is always available for operations in the mining industry. Considering that dumptruck is a complex and relatively expensive equipment so that is more economical to carry out maintenance at maintenance service agents. If maintenance is carried out by the mining industry owners, they cannot perform maintenance actions as well as maintenance carried out by the maintenance service agent, because of the limited resources in the owner. <br /> <br /> In this study, a maintenance contract that involves two parties, the owner and the agent is considered by the operating conditions. The maintenance contract from the owner's perspective requires dumptruck for mining operations so that the availability of equipment is the main key to meeting production targets and obtaining optimal profits. Agents offer maintenance contracts to owners which consist of 3 (three) options, those are (i) preventive maintenance in-house owners and corrective maintenance of agents, (ii) preventive maintenance and corrective prevention of agents, (iii) preventive maintenance on agent and corrective maintenance on the owner's in-house, and will determine the optimal price for each option. The owner will then choose the best option based on the options offered by the agent. The model used for both decision-making issues is formulated with nash game theory, so the optimal decision is a win-win solution.