FORM AND PATTERN OF OVERSIGHT FUNCTION OF INDONESIANHOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVE (DPR RI) (Case Study: The Process of Contract of Work Renegotiation between the Government of Indonesia and PT. Freeport Indonesia (PTFI)
The fourth amendment of the constitution of Republic Indonesia 1945 reformed Indonesia constitutional system by changing the function of state institutions. Although the separation of power among legislative, executive, and judiciary institutions using a mechanism of check and balances, the resul...
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| Format: | Theses |
| Language: | Indonesia |
| Online Access: | https://digilib.itb.ac.id/gdl/view/33301 |
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| Institution: | Institut Teknologi Bandung |
| Language: | Indonesia |
| Summary: | The fourth amendment of the constitution of Republic Indonesia 1945 reformed
Indonesia constitutional system by changing the function of state institutions.
Although the separation of power among legislative, executive, and judiciary
institutions using a mechanism of check and balances, the result Indonesia‘s
politic today is becoming more legislative-heavy. With wider and stronger power
in the hands of the legislative branch DPR RI, it is concerned that DPR RI will
run their three main function; legislation, budgeting, and oversight occurrence of
irregularities that exceed the limits to its powers. This research aims, to
understand, to analyze and also to create forms and patterns through the
implementation of DPR RI oversight function related to the constitutional system
of Indonesia.
To achieve this research, a qualitative approach have been done by tracing the
actors and network that are connected one another with the implementation of
DPR RI oversight function, by using an actor network theory (ANT) as a tool.
Literature study is carried out to explore how the Indonesia constitutional system
are formed and changed. The discussion of trias politica system with check and
balances also addressed.
The results from this research, there are two notching issues in the implementation
of DPR RI oversight function; (1) an issue could be listed in the main agenda of
DPR RI oversight function, if notching issues were from strong network, (2) an
oversight agenda will continue to be on the agenda of DPR RI oversight function,
if the networking agenda was constantly formed by powerful actors. Another
finding, there are two patterns in the implementation of DPR RI oversight
function; (1) pattern using a bill as brenchmark for oversight activity (2) pattern
using the people's aspirations as reference for oversight activity. The conclusion
from this research is most members of the DPR RI not exactly on the right path in
translating constitutional rights, led to use of forms and patterns in the oversight
function to execute the mechanism of check and balances between the state
institutions, vulnerable exceeded its power limit, it is concerned that separation of
power turned into a seeking of power. |
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