LEASE CONTRACT MODEL BY CONSIDERING WITHOUT MONITORING AND WITH MONITORING MAINTANENCE SYSTEM

• Main Author: Zsa Zsa Leani Leuser, Putri
• Format: Theses
• Language: Indonesia
• Online Access: https://digilib.itb.ac.id/gdl/view/54137
• Institution: Institut Teknologi Bandung

The equipment lease contract model in this research where the agent will offer three maintenance policy options i.e., without monitoring (Time-Based Maintenance - TBM), with monitoring (Condition-Based Maintenance - CBM), and the consumer do not choose any maintenance Policies or the option where the consumer performs maintenance independently (in- house). The search for a lease contract model solution is conducted from the point of view of agents and consumers. The maintenance policy chosen will influence the total expected profit for the agent and the consumer. The equipment considered in this study is repairable equipment such as a dump truck. The equipment failure model will be formulated using the Accelerated Failure Time (AFT) method which facilitates the usage and operating condition factors to be incorporated into the degradation process of the equipment. In a TBM policy, the optimal level of preventive maintenance and the amount of preventive maintenance are obtained that minimize the total maintenance costs, while in a CBM policy the agent, the optimal value of the monitoring interval and threshold for preventive maintenance needs to be determining such that to minimize the total cost of maintenance. The optimal decision for the agent and the consumer is modelled using a Nash game theory formulation. The Nash game theory was chosen because both parties want to get a win-win solution – i.e., an equal benefit for each party (agent and consumer) so that neither party would be disadvantaged. The optimal decision is sought using numerical methods where parameters of failure distributions, relevant costs and revenues are set hypothetically.