LARGE LANGUAGE MODEL-BASED TESTING FOR CROSS-SITE SCRIPTING VULNERABILITIES

Cross-site scripting is one of the vulnerabilities that is always being published in the fourth last OWASP Top 10's publication. Moreover, cross-site scripting is the most reported vulnerability in CVEDetails' site. In fact, this vulnerability shows an increasing trend in the last ten y...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Author: Ramadhana P. K., Rizky
Format: Final Project
Language:Indonesia
Online Access:https://digilib.itb.ac.id/gdl/view/82472
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Institution: Institut Teknologi Bandung
Language: Indonesia
Description
Summary:Cross-site scripting is one of the vulnerabilities that is always being published in the fourth last OWASP Top 10's publication. Moreover, cross-site scripting is the most reported vulnerability in CVEDetails' site. In fact, this vulnerability shows an increasing trend in the last ten years. So, it can be concluded that a comprehensive testing mechanism is needed to prevent this vulnerability from happening. To address the prevalence of cross-site scripting vulnerabilities, many researches and tools have been made. However, those tools still have a high false positive rate and are dependent on the tech stack being used. For example, XSStrike is not confirming the vulnerabilities with an attack, not even being able to create a payload for DOM cross-site scripting. Another example comes from Mohammadi et al. (2017) that can only be used for software using JSP. This Final Project proposes a cross-site scripting detection tool that validates the vulnerability by directly attacking the target. By using payloads created by a large language model with the few-shot prompting technique, the tool proposed in this Final Project has a comparable performance as the baseline, XSStrike, in server cross-site scripting detection. Moreover, this tool outperforms XSStrike in client cross-site scripting detection. In short, this tool can detect 59 out of 92 cross-site scripting vulnerabilities in a testbed called Google Firing Range. The tool proposed can also reduce the false positive rate to zero in a test to open source software Airflow. All these performances are achieved with only $0.01 additional cost for each page tested. However, the automatic prompt engineering technique used in this Final Project is not exactly the same with the original theory and the small number of vulnerabilities tested in Airflow can be suggestions for next research.