Political Connection, Foreign Institutional Investors And Tunneling: Evidence From Indonesia

The purpose of this study is to examine the moderating effect of foreign institutional investors on the relationship between political connection and tunneling. To achieve this goal, our study has examined all companies listed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange between 2015 and 2019, and obtained 1,571...

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Main Authors: Elva Nuraina, -, Mohammad Nasih, -, Dian Agustia, -
Format: Article PeerReviewed
Language:English
English
Indonesian
Published: Vilnius Gediminas Technical University 2022
Subjects:
Online Access:https://repository.unair.ac.id/127404/1/MohNasih_Karil116_Political-Connection%2C-Foreign.pdf
https://repository.unair.ac.id/127404/2/MohNasih_Similarity116_Political-Connection%2C-Foreign.pdf
https://repository.unair.ac.id/127404/3/MohNasih_KualitasKaril116.pdf
https://repository.unair.ac.id/127404/
https://journals.vilniustech.lt/index.php/BTP/article/view/16025
https://doi.org/10.3846/btp.2022.16025
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spelling id-langga.1274042023-06-16T04:27:04Z https://repository.unair.ac.id/127404/ Political Connection, Foreign Institutional Investors And Tunneling: Evidence From Indonesia Elva Nuraina, - Mohammad Nasih, - Dian Agustia, - H Social Sciences HG Finance The purpose of this study is to examine the moderating effect of foreign institutional investors on the relationship between political connection and tunneling. To achieve this goal, our study has examined all companies listed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange between 2015 and 2019, and obtained 1,571 firm-year observations. By using a quantitative approach and data analysis using moderated regression analysis, the results of this study indicate that foreign institutional investors play a role in weakening political connections to tunneling. This shows that foreign institutional investors have a role in reducing tunneling. These investors influence the behavior and performance of the company, so, even though the company has political ties, foreign institutional investors are less susceptible to political pressure and are more likely to negotiate to enhance the interests of minority shareholders, and protect their reputations. This finding has important implications for regulators to consider when evaluating the Investor Protection Act, in particular the protection of minority shareholder rights in companies with political ties. Vilnius Gediminas Technical University 2022 Article PeerReviewed text en https://repository.unair.ac.id/127404/1/MohNasih_Karil116_Political-Connection%2C-Foreign.pdf text en https://repository.unair.ac.id/127404/2/MohNasih_Similarity116_Political-Connection%2C-Foreign.pdf text id https://repository.unair.ac.id/127404/3/MohNasih_KualitasKaril116.pdf Elva Nuraina, - and Mohammad Nasih, - and Dian Agustia, - (2022) Political Connection, Foreign Institutional Investors And Tunneling: Evidence From Indonesia. Business: Theory and Practice, 23 (2). pp. 417-426. ISSN 1648-0627, 1822-4202 https://journals.vilniustech.lt/index.php/BTP/article/view/16025 https://doi.org/10.3846/btp.2022.16025
institution Universitas Airlangga
building Universitas Airlangga Library
continent Asia
country Indonesia
Indonesia
content_provider Universitas Airlangga Library
collection UNAIR Repository
language English
English
Indonesian
topic H Social Sciences
HG Finance
spellingShingle H Social Sciences
HG Finance
Elva Nuraina, -
Mohammad Nasih, -
Dian Agustia, -
Political Connection, Foreign Institutional Investors And Tunneling: Evidence From Indonesia
description The purpose of this study is to examine the moderating effect of foreign institutional investors on the relationship between political connection and tunneling. To achieve this goal, our study has examined all companies listed on the Indonesia Stock Exchange between 2015 and 2019, and obtained 1,571 firm-year observations. By using a quantitative approach and data analysis using moderated regression analysis, the results of this study indicate that foreign institutional investors play a role in weakening political connections to tunneling. This shows that foreign institutional investors have a role in reducing tunneling. These investors influence the behavior and performance of the company, so, even though the company has political ties, foreign institutional investors are less susceptible to political pressure and are more likely to negotiate to enhance the interests of minority shareholders, and protect their reputations. This finding has important implications for regulators to consider when evaluating the Investor Protection Act, in particular the protection of minority shareholder rights in companies with political ties.
format Article
PeerReviewed
author Elva Nuraina, -
Mohammad Nasih, -
Dian Agustia, -
author_facet Elva Nuraina, -
Mohammad Nasih, -
Dian Agustia, -
author_sort Elva Nuraina, -
title Political Connection, Foreign Institutional Investors And Tunneling: Evidence From Indonesia
title_short Political Connection, Foreign Institutional Investors And Tunneling: Evidence From Indonesia
title_full Political Connection, Foreign Institutional Investors And Tunneling: Evidence From Indonesia
title_fullStr Political Connection, Foreign Institutional Investors And Tunneling: Evidence From Indonesia
title_full_unstemmed Political Connection, Foreign Institutional Investors And Tunneling: Evidence From Indonesia
title_sort political connection, foreign institutional investors and tunneling: evidence from indonesia
publisher Vilnius Gediminas Technical University
publishDate 2022
url https://repository.unair.ac.id/127404/1/MohNasih_Karil116_Political-Connection%2C-Foreign.pdf
https://repository.unair.ac.id/127404/2/MohNasih_Similarity116_Political-Connection%2C-Foreign.pdf
https://repository.unair.ac.id/127404/3/MohNasih_KualitasKaril116.pdf
https://repository.unair.ac.id/127404/
https://journals.vilniustech.lt/index.php/BTP/article/view/16025
https://doi.org/10.3846/btp.2022.16025
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