Cryptanalysis of the SHMW signature scheme

In recent research, Durandal, a signature scheme based on rank metrics following Schnorr's approach, was introduced to conceal secret key information by selectively manipulating the vector subspace of signatures. Later, an enhancement, namely the SHMW signature scheme, with smaller keys and sig...

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Main Authors: Lau, Terry Shue Chien, Kamel Ariffin, Muhammad Rezal, Yip, Sook-Chin, Chin, Ji-Jian, Ting, Choo-Yee
Format: Article
Language:English
Published: Elsevier 2024
Online Access:http://psasir.upm.edu.my/id/eprint/105776/1/PIIS2405844024002160.pdf
http://psasir.upm.edu.my/id/eprint/105776/
https://linkinghub.elsevier.com/retrieve/pii/S2405844024002160
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Institution: Universiti Putra Malaysia
Language: English
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spelling my.upm.eprints.1057762024-09-03T04:09:00Z http://psasir.upm.edu.my/id/eprint/105776/ Cryptanalysis of the SHMW signature scheme Lau, Terry Shue Chien Kamel Ariffin, Muhammad Rezal Yip, Sook-Chin Chin, Ji-Jian Ting, Choo-Yee In recent research, Durandal, a signature scheme based on rank metrics following Schnorr's approach, was introduced to conceal secret key information by selectively manipulating the vector subspace of signatures. Later, an enhancement, namely the SHMW signature scheme, with smaller keys and signatures while maintaining EUF-CMA security, was proposed. Both Durandal and SHMW require adversaries to solve hard problems (i.e., Rank Support Learning, Rank Syndrome Decoding, and Affine Rank Syndrome Decoding) for secret key retrieval, in which the parameters are designed to withstand at least 128-bit computational complexity. The authors claimed that the security of the SHMW scheme is deemed superior to that of the original Durandal scheme. In this paper, we introduce a novel approach to identifying weak keys within the Durandal framework to prove the superiority of the SHMW scheme. This approach exploits the extra information in the signature to compute an intersection space that contains the secret key. Consequently, a cryptanalysis of the SHMW signature scheme was carried out to demonstrate the insecurity of the selected keys within the SHWM scheme. In particular, we proposed an algorithm to recover an extended support that contains the secret key used in the signature schemes. Applying our approach to the SHMW scheme, we can recover its secret key with only 97-bit complexity, although it was claimed that the proposed parameters achieve a 128-bit security level. The results of our proposed approaches show that the security level of the SHMW signature scheme is inferior compared to that of the original Durandal scheme. Elsevier 2024-01 Article PeerReviewed text en http://psasir.upm.edu.my/id/eprint/105776/1/PIIS2405844024002160.pdf Lau, Terry Shue Chien and Kamel Ariffin, Muhammad Rezal and Yip, Sook-Chin and Chin, Ji-Jian and Ting, Choo-Yee (2024) Cryptanalysis of the SHMW signature scheme. Heliyon, 10 (2). pp. 1-11. ISSN 2405-8440 https://linkinghub.elsevier.com/retrieve/pii/S2405844024002160 10.1016/j.heliyon.2024.e24185
institution Universiti Putra Malaysia
building UPM Library
collection Institutional Repository
continent Asia
country Malaysia
content_provider Universiti Putra Malaysia
content_source UPM Institutional Repository
url_provider http://psasir.upm.edu.my/
language English
description In recent research, Durandal, a signature scheme based on rank metrics following Schnorr's approach, was introduced to conceal secret key information by selectively manipulating the vector subspace of signatures. Later, an enhancement, namely the SHMW signature scheme, with smaller keys and signatures while maintaining EUF-CMA security, was proposed. Both Durandal and SHMW require adversaries to solve hard problems (i.e., Rank Support Learning, Rank Syndrome Decoding, and Affine Rank Syndrome Decoding) for secret key retrieval, in which the parameters are designed to withstand at least 128-bit computational complexity. The authors claimed that the security of the SHMW scheme is deemed superior to that of the original Durandal scheme. In this paper, we introduce a novel approach to identifying weak keys within the Durandal framework to prove the superiority of the SHMW scheme. This approach exploits the extra information in the signature to compute an intersection space that contains the secret key. Consequently, a cryptanalysis of the SHMW signature scheme was carried out to demonstrate the insecurity of the selected keys within the SHWM scheme. In particular, we proposed an algorithm to recover an extended support that contains the secret key used in the signature schemes. Applying our approach to the SHMW scheme, we can recover its secret key with only 97-bit complexity, although it was claimed that the proposed parameters achieve a 128-bit security level. The results of our proposed approaches show that the security level of the SHMW signature scheme is inferior compared to that of the original Durandal scheme.
format Article
author Lau, Terry Shue Chien
Kamel Ariffin, Muhammad Rezal
Yip, Sook-Chin
Chin, Ji-Jian
Ting, Choo-Yee
spellingShingle Lau, Terry Shue Chien
Kamel Ariffin, Muhammad Rezal
Yip, Sook-Chin
Chin, Ji-Jian
Ting, Choo-Yee
Cryptanalysis of the SHMW signature scheme
author_facet Lau, Terry Shue Chien
Kamel Ariffin, Muhammad Rezal
Yip, Sook-Chin
Chin, Ji-Jian
Ting, Choo-Yee
author_sort Lau, Terry Shue Chien
title Cryptanalysis of the SHMW signature scheme
title_short Cryptanalysis of the SHMW signature scheme
title_full Cryptanalysis of the SHMW signature scheme
title_fullStr Cryptanalysis of the SHMW signature scheme
title_full_unstemmed Cryptanalysis of the SHMW signature scheme
title_sort cryptanalysis of the shmw signature scheme
publisher Elsevier
publishDate 2024
url http://psasir.upm.edu.my/id/eprint/105776/1/PIIS2405844024002160.pdf
http://psasir.upm.edu.my/id/eprint/105776/
https://linkinghub.elsevier.com/retrieve/pii/S2405844024002160
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