On the security defects of an image encryption scheme
This paper studies the security of a recently-proposed chaos-based image encryption scheme and points out the following problems: (1) there exist a number of invalid keys and weak keys, and some keys are partially equivalent for encryption/decryption; (2) given one chosen plain-image, a subkey K<...
Saved in:
| Main Authors: | , , , , , |
|---|---|
| Format: | Article |
| Published: |
2009
|
| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | http://eprints.utp.edu.my/457/1/paper.pdf http://www.scopus.com/inward/record.url?eid=2-s2.0-67349203285&partnerID=40&md5=5385f9470ba91a7ead6bdefd47b999d7 http://eprints.utp.edu.my/457/ |
| Tags: |
Add Tag
No Tags, Be the first to tag this record!
|
| Institution: | Universiti Teknologi Petronas |
| Summary: | This paper studies the security of a recently-proposed chaos-based image encryption scheme and points out the following problems: (1) there exist a number of invalid keys and weak keys, and some keys are partially equivalent for encryption/decryption; (2) given one chosen plain-image, a subkey K<sub>10</sub> can be guessed with a smaller computational complexity than that of the simple brute-force attack; (3) given at most 128 chosen plain-images, a chosen-plaintext attack can possibly break the following part of the secret key: fenced(K<sub>i</sub> mod 128)<sub>i = 4</sub><sup>10</sup>, which works very well when K<sub>10</sub> is not too large; (4) when K<sub>10</sub> is relatively small, a known-plaintext attack can be carried out with only one known plain-image to recover some visual information of any other plain-images encrypted by the same key. © 2009 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
|
|---|