Nonbayesian Decision Theory

This book aims to present an account of rational choice from a non-Bayesian point of view. Rational agents maximize subjective expected utility, but contrary to what is claimed by Bayesians, the author argues that utility and subjective probability should not be defined in terms of preferences over...

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Main Author: Peterson, Martin
Format: Book
Language:English
Published: Springer 2017
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Online Access:http://repository.vnu.edu.vn/handle/VNU_123/28501
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Institution: Vietnam National University, Hanoi
Language: English
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spelling oai:112.137.131.14:VNU_123-285012020-07-05T14:26:23Z Nonbayesian Decision Theory Peterson, Martin Decision making -- Mathematical models ; Bayesian statistical decision theory ; Utility theory -- Mathematical models ; Rational choice theory --Mathematical models. 519.542 This book aims to present an account of rational choice from a non-Bayesian point of view. Rational agents maximize subjective expected utility, but contrary to what is claimed by Bayesians, the author argues that utility and subjective probability should not be defined in terms of preferences over uncertain prospects. To some extent, the author’s non-Bayesian view gives a modern account of what decision theory could have been like, had decision theorists not entered the Bayesian path discovered by Ramsey, Savage, and Jeffrey. The author argues that traditional Bayesian decision theory is unavailing from an action-guiding perspective. For the deliberating Bayesian agent, the output of decision theory is not a set of preferences over alternative acts - these preferences are on the contrary used as input to the theory. Instead, the output is a (set of) utility function(s) that can be used for describing the agent as an expected utility maximizer, which are of limited normative relevance.On the non-Bayesian view articulated by the author, utility and probability are defined in terms of preferences over certain outcomes. These utility and probability functions are then used for generating preferences over uncertain prospects, which conform to the principle of maximizing expected utility. It is argued that this approach offers more action guidance. 2017-04-14T03:12:04Z 2017-04-14T03:12:04Z 2008 Book 9781402086984 http://repository.vnu.edu.vn/handle/VNU_123/28501 en 175 p. application/pdf Springer
institution Vietnam National University, Hanoi
building VNU Library & Information Center
country Vietnam
collection VNU Digital Repository
language English
topic Decision making -- Mathematical models ; Bayesian statistical decision theory ; Utility theory -- Mathematical models ; Rational choice theory --Mathematical models.
519.542
spellingShingle Decision making -- Mathematical models ; Bayesian statistical decision theory ; Utility theory -- Mathematical models ; Rational choice theory --Mathematical models.
519.542
Peterson, Martin
Nonbayesian Decision Theory
description This book aims to present an account of rational choice from a non-Bayesian point of view. Rational agents maximize subjective expected utility, but contrary to what is claimed by Bayesians, the author argues that utility and subjective probability should not be defined in terms of preferences over uncertain prospects. To some extent, the author’s non-Bayesian view gives a modern account of what decision theory could have been like, had decision theorists not entered the Bayesian path discovered by Ramsey, Savage, and Jeffrey. The author argues that traditional Bayesian decision theory is unavailing from an action-guiding perspective. For the deliberating Bayesian agent, the output of decision theory is not a set of preferences over alternative acts - these preferences are on the contrary used as input to the theory. Instead, the output is a (set of) utility function(s) that can be used for describing the agent as an expected utility maximizer, which are of limited normative relevance.On the non-Bayesian view articulated by the author, utility and probability are defined in terms of preferences over certain outcomes. These utility and probability functions are then used for generating preferences over uncertain prospects, which conform to the principle of maximizing expected utility. It is argued that this approach offers more action guidance.
format Book
author Peterson, Martin
author_facet Peterson, Martin
author_sort Peterson, Martin
title Nonbayesian Decision Theory
title_short Nonbayesian Decision Theory
title_full Nonbayesian Decision Theory
title_fullStr Nonbayesian Decision Theory
title_full_unstemmed Nonbayesian Decision Theory
title_sort nonbayesian decision theory
publisher Springer
publishDate 2017
url http://repository.vnu.edu.vn/handle/VNU_123/28501
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