Willful Ignorance, Self-Deception, and the Motivation Condition– A Reply to M. Glowicki (2018)
Despite being given significant attention in the philosophical literature, the account of willful ignorance is still constantly debated upon. Philosophers such as Glowicki (2018) have debated that the inconvenience of knowing the proposition is not necessary for one to be willfully ignorant because...
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| Format: | text |
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Animo Repository
2021
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| Online Access: | https://animorepository.dlsu.edu.ph/conf_shsrescon/2021/paper_tph/2 https://animorepository.dlsu.edu.ph/context/conf_shsrescon/article/1708/viewcontent/Matubis.pdf |
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| Institution: | De La Salle University |
| Summary: | Despite being given significant attention in the philosophical literature, the account of willful ignorance is still constantly debated upon. Philosophers such as Glowicki (2018) have debated that the inconvenience of knowing the proposition is not necessary for one to be willfully ignorant because of the instances of ‘praiseworthy willful ignorance’ that he proposes. In this article, I will argue that while this is true, her account is insufficient as though it need not be inconvenient, one must still have a motive to remain willfully ignorant of the proposition. With this, I will explain the importance of the motivation condition in the account of willful ignorance and how its necessity disproves Glowicki’s (2018) claim that there is a close relationship between willful ignorance and self-deception. |
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