To evade or to pay: A perfect bayesian equilibrium in a government-importer game
This paper studies the phenomenon of tariff evasion using a simple signaling model. Perfect Bayesian equilibrium is used to determine importer's optimal actions (to evade or to pay his tariff liability) after observing the signal of the government (high tariff rates or low tariff rates), given...
Saved in:
Main Authors: | De La Rosa, Mary Patricia G., Respicio, Jerrie Mae Hyvi P., Samson, Craig Brendon G. |
---|---|
Format: | text |
Language: | English |
Published: |
Animo Repository
2013
|
Subjects: | |
Online Access: | https://animorepository.dlsu.edu.ph/etd_bachelors/10695 |
Tags: |
Add Tag
No Tags, Be the first to tag this record!
|
Institution: | De La Salle University |
Language: | English |
Similar Items
-
PROFESSIONAL NEGLIGENCE PROBLEMS
by: LONG SEE HONG
Published: (2019) -
A critical analysis of the compulsory third party liability insurance program in the Philippines
by: Belisario, Jocelyn Guevara
Published: (1981) -
A proposed insurance product for females
by: Abaoag, Mary Grace E., et al.
Published: (1995) -
Medical malpractice litigation in Thailand
by: Apiwon Insorn
Published: (2023) -
An analysis of product liability insurance of Singapore exporters.
by: Wat, Lai Lian.
Published: (2009)