An application of voting power and inferior players to the United Nations Security Council Enlargement

• Main Author: Nanquil, Mark Edward L.
• Format: text
• Language: English
• Published: Animo Repository 2006
• Subjects: Generating functions; Power (Social Sciences); Coalition (Social Sciences)
• Online Access: https://animorepository.dlsu.edu.ph/etd_bachelors/17426
• Institution: De La Salle University

This paper is an exposition of the article entitled Voting Power in the European Union enlargement by J.B. Bilbao, J.R. Fernandez, N. Jimenez and J.J. Lopez and the article entitled Inferior players in simple games by S. Napel and M. Widgren. We analyze the proposed expansion of the United Nations Security Council using the power index method and evaluate the role that inferior players portray in decision making in the United Nations Security Council. The results prove two assertions in the field of international relations. First, we have proved that non-permanent members of the Security Council are inferior players. Second, membership expansion in the United Nations Security Council will not solve the disparity of power distribution in the Security Council. In fact, the original 5 permanent members namely: China, France, Russian Federation, United Kingdom and the United States of America will be more powerful if the right of veto will not be extended to new permanent members. As a policy recommendation, member states of the United Nations should pass a resolution calling for the nullification of Chapter 5, Article 27-3 of the UN Charter which refers to the great power unanimity more popularly known as veto power to promote equality of voting power in the Security Council.