Design matters: The comparative case studies of the performances of Independent Anti-Corruption Commissions (IACs) in Singapore, Hong-kong, Philippines and Nigeria
The past several decades have witnessed the acknowledgement of the huge costs of corruption for the socio-economic development of many countries and various ways of eliminating or reducing such costs have been highlighted and attempted with varying degree of success. One way that was seen as a panac...
Saved in:
| Main Author: | |
|---|---|
| Format: | text |
| Language: | English |
| Published: |
Animo Repository
2011
|
| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | https://animorepository.dlsu.edu.ph/etd_doctoral/1237 https://animorepository.dlsu.edu.ph/context/etd_doctoral/article/2238/viewcontent/CDTG005053_P.pdf |
| Tags: |
Add Tag
No Tags, Be the first to tag this record!
|
| Institution: | De La Salle University |
| Language: | English |
| Summary: | The past several decades have witnessed the acknowledgement of the huge costs of corruption for the socio-economic development of many countries and various ways of eliminating or reducing such costs have been highlighted and attempted with varying degree of success. One way that was seen as a panacea for corruption especially in many developing countries was the establishment of a specific agency to prevent corruption or to investigate and punish corrupt practices. Since the birth of the Corrupt Practices Investigation Bureau (CPIB) in Singapore in 1952, many of such agencies commonly called the Independent Anti-Corruption Commissions (IACs) have come into being. The purpose of this study is to examine the effect of design of an IAC on its eventual performance and effectiveness and it utilized the comparative case-study approach to explore and explain the role design played in the varying performance recorded by five IACs in four different countries. The IACs are the CPIB in Singapore, the Independent Commission Against Corruption (ICAC) in Hong-Kong, the Ombudsman in the Philippines and both the Independent Corrupt Practices Commission (ICPC) and the Economic and Financial Crimes Commission (EFCC) in Nigeria. The research identified six design indicators upon which its findings were predicated. These indicators were accountability (discretional powers) independence (political neutrality and fiscal autonomy) investigative powers enforcement and adjudication process system of government and mode of establishment. The study found that in designing an agency that is expected to optimally perform its sole duty of curbing corruption, it is imperative to take these design indicators into consideration. |
|---|