An analysis of the problems on the reporting of accomplishment of infrastructure projects in the DPWH

• Main Author: Cunanan, Paul Justine S.
• Format: text
• Language: English
• Published: Animo Repository 2020
• Subjects: Infrastructure (Economics) > Philippines; Public works > Philippines; Philippines.Department of Public Works and Highways; Infrastructure; Public Affairs, Public Policy and Public Administration
• Online Access: https://animorepository.dlsu.edu.ph/etd_masteral/5934; https://animorepository.dlsu.edu.ph/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=12924&context=etd_masteral
• Institution: De La Salle University

Project monitoring is an activity that involves a continuous and systematic observation and checking of the current state of a project. However, in the Philippines, COA reports in recent years revealed that there were deficiencies worth billions of pesos in some projects of the DPWH that are caused by poor monitoring practices. One cause of these problems is the chronic misreporting of the accomplishment of projects. This practice has been rampant in the DPWH until now, despite the continuous recommendations from experts and other agencies of the government. The objective of this study is to find the reasons for the persistent problem of misreporting of accomplishment of projects in the DPWH with the use of Williamson’s Four Levels of Institutional Analysis. The source of primary data is collected from participant observation of the researcher and in-depth interviews of the engineers in the DPWH. Evidence using the framework revealed that project monitoring has problems at all levels. The first level emphasizes embeddedness of an institution. It was discovered that bloating of accomplishment of projects and corruption had already been part of the norms in the DPWH. These informal institutions evolved and remained beneath the many changes in formal institutions. The second level of institutional analysis is about the institutional environment or the formal rules of the game. This level exposes problems in manpower in the implementing offices of DPWH – Region I which affect the accuracy of data reflected in PCMA. Adding to this are policies of the DPWH that negatively affect the effectiveness of the use of PCMA. It was also discovered data validation, which ensures the correctness of data in PCMA, is not frequently conducted and has no specific guidelines. The third level, institutions of governance (play of the game), shed the light on problems in rule enforcement. The mutual relationship among the engineers and the contractors resulted in a systematic misreporting of projects in the IOs. The frequent non-implementation of sanctions among the engineers promotes misreporting of accomplishment of projects with minimal risks. The last level focuses on individual actors. This shows the problems on the basis of incentives in relation to the physical and financial targets of the agency and the lack of accountability in project monitoring. The findings of this study can be used in the formulation, implementation, and further improvements of policies among the agencies of the government, especially in the DPWH.