On the nonexistence of non-convergent Nash equilibria in disapproval voting
In democratic societies, elections are done to determine rightful candidates to hold public office. In situations where voters are required to rank all the political candidates from most preferred to the least, a scoring rule is used. In an election held under a scoring rule, a candidate receives a...
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2022
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| 在線閱讀: | https://animorepository.dlsu.edu.ph/etdb_math/19 https://animorepository.dlsu.edu.ph/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1020&context=etdb_math |
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| 機構: | De La Salle University |
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