On the nonexistence of non-convergent Nash equilibria in disapproval voting

In democratic societies, elections are done to determine rightful candidates to hold public office. In situations where voters are required to rank all the political candidates from most preferred to the least, a scoring rule is used. In an election held under a scoring rule, a candidate receives a...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Authors: Go, Justin Ervin D., Pinto, Jonathan O.
Format: text
Language:English
Published: Animo Repository 2022
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Online Access:https://animorepository.dlsu.edu.ph/etdb_math/19
https://animorepository.dlsu.edu.ph/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=1020&context=etdb_math
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Institution: De La Salle University
Language: English

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