Compellingness in Nash implementation

Compellingness in Nash implementation

A social choice function (SCF) is said to be Nash implementable if there exists a mechanism in which every Nash equilibrium outcome coincides with that specified by the SCF. The main objective of this paper is to assess the impact of considering mixed strategy equilibria in Nash implementation. To do...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Authors: CHATTERJI, Shurojit, KUNIMOTO, Takashi, RAMOS, Paulo Daniel Salles
Format: text
Language:English
Published: Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University 2024
Subjects:
implementation
compelling equilibria
ordinality
mixed strate-gies
Nash equilibrium.
Economic Theory
Online Access:https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soe_research/2626
https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/context/soe_research/article/3625/viewcontent/Compelling_Implementation_11_Feb_2024_.pdf
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Institution: Singapore Management University
Language: English

Internet

https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soe_research/2626
https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/context/soe_research/article/3625/viewcontent/Compelling_Implementation_11_Feb_2024_.pdf

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