Mixed bayesian implementation in general environments

Mixed bayesian implementation in general environments

A social choice rule is said to be mixed Bayesian implementable if one can design a mechanism (or institution) in which the set of all mixed Bayesian Nash equilibrium outcomes coincides with that specified by the rule. The objective of this paper is to generalize the results of mixed Bayesian implem...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Author: KUNIMOTO, Takashi
Format: text
Language:English
Published: Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University 2019
Subjects:
Bayesian implementation
Closure
Incentive compatibility
Mixed Bayesian monotonicity
Nash implementation
Social choice set
Economic Theory
Online Access:https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soe_research/2267
https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/context/soe_research/article/3266/viewcontent/1_s20_S0304406819300382_main.pdf
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Institution: Singapore Management University
Language: English

Internet

https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soe_research/2267
https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/context/soe_research/article/3266/viewcontent/1_s20_S0304406819300382_main.pdf

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