Rationalizable Incentives: Interim Implementation of Sets in Rationalizable Strategies

Rationalizable Incentives: Interim Implementation of Sets in Rationalizable Strategies

This paper investigates rationalizable implementation of social choice sets (SCSs) in incomplete information environments. We identify rationalizable incentive compatibility (RIC) as its key condition, argue by means of example that RIC is strictly weaker than the standard Bayesian incentive compati...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Authors: KUNIMOTO, Takashi, SERRANO, Roberto
Format: text
Language:English
Published: Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University 2020
Subjects:
Rationalizable incentive compatibility
Bayesian incentive com-patibility
uniform Bayesian monotonicity
interim rationalizable monotonic-ity
implementation
rationalizability.
Economic Theory
Online Access:https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soe_research/2354
https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/context/soe_research/article/3353/viewcontent/incomplete_information_rationalizable_implementation_2020_1_31_.pdf
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Institution: Singapore Management University
Language: English

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https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soe_research/2354
https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/context/soe_research/article/3353/viewcontent/incomplete_information_rationalizable_implementation_2020_1_31_.pdf

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