Robust implementation in rationalizable strategies in general mechanisms

• Main Authors: KUNIMOTO, Takashi, SARAN, Rene
• Format: text
• Language: English
• Published: Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University 2024
• Subjects: Ex post incentive compatibility; rationalizability; interim equilibrium; robust implementation; weak rationalizable implementation; weak robust monotonicity; Economic Theory
• Online Access: https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soe_research/2373; https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/context/soe_research/article/3372/viewcontent/RoRat_Implementation_March_12_2024.pdf
• Institution: Singapore Management University

A social choice function (SCF) is robustly implementable in rationalizable strate-gies if every rationalizable strategy profile on every type space results in outcomes consistent with it. First, we establish an equivalence between robust implementation in rationalizable strategies and “weak rationali...