Mixed bayesian implementation in general environments
A social choice rule is said to be mixed Bayesian implementable if one can design a mechanism (or institution) in which the set of all mixed Bayesian Nash equilibrium outcomes coincides with that specified by the rule. The objective of this paper is to generalize the results of mixed Bayesian implem...
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Main Author: | KUNIMOTO, Takashi |
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Format: | text |
Language: | English |
Published: |
Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University
2019
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Subjects: | |
Online Access: | https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soe_research/2267 https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/context/soe_research/article/3266/viewcontent/1_s20_S0304406819300382_main.pdf |
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Institution: | Singapore Management University |
Language: | English |
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