On incentive compatible, individually rational public good provision mechanisms

This paper characterizes mechanisms satisfying Bayesian incentive compatibility (BIC) and interim individual rationality (IIR) in the classical public good provision problem. Many papers in the literature obtain the results in the so-called standard model of ex ante identical agents with a continuou...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Authors: KUNIMOTO, Takashi, ZHANG, Cuiling
Format: text
Language:English
Published: Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University 2018
Subjects:
Online Access:https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soe_research/2212
https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/context/soe_research/article/3211/viewcontent/public_good_Nov_18_2018_.pdf
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Institution: Singapore Management University
Language: English