The interplay of interdependence and correlation in bilateral trade

The interplay of interdependence and correlation in bilateral trade

Crémer and McLean (1988) show that the seller can extract full surplus almost always by an incentive compatible, individually rational mechanism in a single-unit auction model with a finite type space in which agents' beliefs are correlated and their valuations can be interdependent. We first s...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Authors: KUNIMOTO, Takashi, ZHANG, Cuiling
Format: text
Language:English
Published: Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University 2024
Subjects:
auction theory
incentive compatible
individually rational mechanism
finite type space
correlated beliefs
interdependent valuations
bilateral trades
ex-post efficiency
budget balance
linear valuation
Economic Theory
Online Access:https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soe_research/2736
https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/context/soe_research/article/3735/viewcontent/interdependence_and_correlation_March_30_2024.pdf
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Institution: Singapore Management University
Language: English

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https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soe_research/2736
https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/context/soe_research/article/3735/viewcontent/interdependence_and_correlation_March_30_2024.pdf

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