On incentive compatible, individually rational public good provision mechanisms

On incentive compatible, individually rational public good provision mechanisms

This paper characterizes mechanisms satisfying incentive compatibility and individual rationality in the classical public good provision problem. Many papers in the literature obtain the results in the so-called standard model of ex ante identical agents with a continuous, closed interval of types....

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Bibliographic Details
Main Authors: KUNIMOTO, Takashi, ZHANG, Cuiling
Format: text
Language:English
Published: Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University 2021
Subjects:
Budget balance
decision efficiency
incentive compatibility
individual rationality; mechanisms; public goods
Economic Theory
Public Economics
Online Access:https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soe_research/2540
https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/context/soe_research/article/3539/viewcontent/public_good_Mar_06_2021.pdf
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Institution: Singapore Management University
Language: English

Internet

https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soe_research/2540
https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/context/soe_research/article/3539/viewcontent/public_good_Mar_06_2021.pdf

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