Indescribability and asymmetric information at the contracting stage

Indescribability and asymmetric information at the contracting stage

Maskin and Tirole [Maskin, E., Tirole, J., 1999. Unforeseen contingencies and incomplete contracts. Review of Economic Studies, 66, 83–114] show that indescribability does not matter for contractual incompleteness when there is symmetric information both at the contracting stage and at the trading s...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Author: KUNIMOTO, Takashi
Format: text
Language:English
Published: Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University 2008
Subjects:
Asymmetric information
Incentive compatibility
Incomplete contracts
Indescribability
Individual rationality
Behavioral Economics
Economic Theory
Online Access:https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soe_research/2007
https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/context/soe_research/article/3006/viewcontent/1_s20_S0165176507002947_main.pdf
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Institution: Singapore Management University
Language: English

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https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soe_research/2007
https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/context/soe_research/article/3006/viewcontent/1_s20_S0165176507002947_main.pdf

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