On incentive compatible, individually rational public good provision mechanisms

• المؤلفون الرئيسيون: KUNIMOTO, Takashi, ZHANG, Cuiling
• التنسيق: text
• اللغة: English
• منشور في: Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University 2018
• الموضوعات: Budget balance; decision efficiency; incentive compatibility; individual rationality; mechanisms; public goods; Economics; Economic Theory
• الوصول للمادة أونلاين: https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soe_research/2212; https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/context/soe_research/article/3211/viewcontent/public_good_Nov_18_2018_.pdf
• المؤسسة: Singapore Management University

This paper characterizes mechanisms satisfying Bayesian incentive compatibility (BIC) and interim individual rationality (IIR) in the classical public good provision problem. Many papers in the literature obtain the results in the so-called standard model of ex ante identical agents with a continuou...