A new necessary condition for implementation in iteratively undominated strategies

A new necessary condition for implementation in iteratively undominated strategies

We uncover a new necessary condition for implementation in iteratively undominated strategies by mechanisms that satisfy the “best element property” where for each agent, there exists a strategy profile that gives him the highest payoff in the mechanism. This class includes finite and regular mechan...

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Bibliographic Details
Main Authors: KUNIMOTO, Takashi, SERRANO, Roberto
Format: text
Language:English
Published: Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University 2011
Subjects:
Mechanism design
Exact and approximate implementation
Iteratively undominated strategies
Restricted deception-proofness
Incentive compatibility
Measurability
Economic Theory
Online Access:https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soe_research/2004
https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/context/soe_research/article/3003/viewcontent/NewNecessaryConditionIteratively_2011_JET.pdf
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Institution: Singapore Management University
Language: English

Internet

https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soe_research/2004
https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/context/soe_research/article/3003/viewcontent/NewNecessaryConditionIteratively_2011_JET.pdf

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