Weak monotonicity characterizes deterministic dominant-strategy implementation

• المؤلفون الرئيسيون: BIKHCHANDANI, Sushil, CHATTERJI, Shurojit, LAVI, Ron, MU'ALEM, Ahuva, NISAN, Noam, SEN, Arunava
• التنسيق: text
• اللغة: English
• منشور في: Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University 2006
• الموضوعات: dominant-strategy implementation; multi-object auctions; Economic Theory
• الوصول للمادة أونلاين: https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soe_research/1887; https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/context/soe_research/article/2887/viewcontent/9712851.pdf

We characterize dominant-strategy incentive compatibility with multidimensional types. A deterministic social choice function is dominant-strategy incentive compatible if and only if it is weakly monotone (W-Mon). The W-Mon requirement is the following: If changing one agent's type (while keepi...