Weak monotonicity characterizes deterministic dominant-strategy implementation

• Main Authors: BIKHCHANDANI, Sushil, CHATTERJI, Shurojit, LAVI, Ron, MU'ALEM, Ahuva, NISAN, Noam, SEN, Arunava
• Format: text
• Language: English
• Published: Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University 2006
• Subjects: dominant-strategy implementation; multi-object auctions; Economic Theory
• Online Access: https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soe_research/1887; https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/context/soe_research/article/2887/viewcontent/9712851.pdf
• Institution: Singapore Management University

We characterize dominant-strategy incentive compatibility with multidimensional types. A deterministic social choice function is dominant-strategy incentive compatible if and only if it is weakly monotone (W-Mon). The W-Mon requirement is the following: If changing one agent's type (while keeping the types of other agents fixed) changes the outcome under the social choice function, then the resulting difference in utilities of the new and original outcomes evaluated at the new type of this agent must be no less than this difference in utilities evaluated at the original type of this agent.