Compellingness in Nash implementation
A social choice function (SCF) is said to be Nash implementable if there exists a mechanism in which every Nash equilibrium outcome coincides with that specified by the SCF. The main objective of this paper is to assess the impact of considering mixed strategy equilibria in Nash implementation. To do...
Saved in:
| Main Authors: | , , |
|---|---|
| Format: | text |
| Language: | English |
| Published: |
Institutional Knowledge at Singapore Management University
2024
|
| Subjects: | |
| Online Access: | https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/soe_research/2626 https://ink.library.smu.edu.sg/context/soe_research/article/3625/viewcontent/Compelling_Implementation_11_Feb_2024_.pdf |
| Tags: |
Add Tag
No Tags, Be the first to tag this record!
|
| Institution: | Singapore Management University |
| Language: | English |