Cyber liability insurance in an offender-defender evolutionary game

In a highly inter-connected economy, businesses are under constant threat of being breached by cybercriminals. Traditional security continues to be an integral foundation in addressing risks and threats from a bottom-up perspective. However, security needs to start considering the perspective of cyb...

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Main Author: Fernandez, Ma. Isabel
Format: text
Published: Animo Repository 2019
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Online Access:https://animorepository.dlsu.edu.ph/faculty_research/11024
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Institution: De La Salle University
id oai:animorepository.dlsu.edu.ph:faculty_research-11267
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spelling oai:animorepository.dlsu.edu.ph:faculty_research-112672023-10-16T06:22:26Z Cyber liability insurance in an offender-defender evolutionary game Fernandez, Ma. Isabel In a highly inter-connected economy, businesses are under constant threat of being breached by cybercriminals. Traditional security continues to be an integral foundation in addressing risks and threats from a bottom-up perspective. However, security needs to start considering the perspective of cybercrime as a constantly evolving profit-driven economy and the potential of cyber insurance in aligning incentives amongst firms, government and security vendors to improve national security. The adoption of game and decision theory offers a top-down approach that serves as a complement to traditional risk management. With this, we build an evolutionary game to model defending firms and cyber criminals under complete information and bounded rationality with insurance as the focal risk management tool. We find that government intervention is justified in ensuring outcomes parallel with national interests of security, and can support the adoption of cyber insurance. 2019-01-01T08:00:00Z text https://animorepository.dlsu.edu.ph/faculty_research/11024 Faculty Research Work Animo Repository Cyber insurance Insurance
institution De La Salle University
building De La Salle University Library
continent Asia
country Philippines
Philippines
content_provider De La Salle University Library
collection DLSU Institutional Repository
topic Cyber insurance
Insurance
spellingShingle Cyber insurance
Insurance
Fernandez, Ma. Isabel
Cyber liability insurance in an offender-defender evolutionary game
description In a highly inter-connected economy, businesses are under constant threat of being breached by cybercriminals. Traditional security continues to be an integral foundation in addressing risks and threats from a bottom-up perspective. However, security needs to start considering the perspective of cybercrime as a constantly evolving profit-driven economy and the potential of cyber insurance in aligning incentives amongst firms, government and security vendors to improve national security. The adoption of game and decision theory offers a top-down approach that serves as a complement to traditional risk management. With this, we build an evolutionary game to model defending firms and cyber criminals under complete information and bounded rationality with insurance as the focal risk management tool. We find that government intervention is justified in ensuring outcomes parallel with national interests of security, and can support the adoption of cyber insurance.
format text
author Fernandez, Ma. Isabel
author_facet Fernandez, Ma. Isabel
author_sort Fernandez, Ma. Isabel
title Cyber liability insurance in an offender-defender evolutionary game
title_short Cyber liability insurance in an offender-defender evolutionary game
title_full Cyber liability insurance in an offender-defender evolutionary game
title_fullStr Cyber liability insurance in an offender-defender evolutionary game
title_full_unstemmed Cyber liability insurance in an offender-defender evolutionary game
title_sort cyber liability insurance in an offender-defender evolutionary game
publisher Animo Repository
publishDate 2019
url https://animorepository.dlsu.edu.ph/faculty_research/11024
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