Vying for support: Lobbying a legislator with uncertain preferences
We consider a model where two opposing lobbyists bid for the support of a legislator with an integrity threshold and an uncertain bias towards either lobbyist. We find that higher winning valuations drive more aggressive lobbying, while higher legislator’s integrity thresholds pushes toward more con...
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| Main Authors: | , , |
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| 格式: | text |
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Animo Repository
2020
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| 在線閱讀: | https://animorepository.dlsu.edu.ph/faculty_research/9510 |
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| 機構: | De La Salle University |