Physician quality and payment schemes: A theoretical and empirical analysis

Physicians are expected to provide the best healthcare to their patients; however, it cannot be discounted that their practice is driven primarily by incentives. In this paper, a physician utility maximization model that links physician quality of service to compensation schemes was constructed. Res...

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Main Author: Calub, Renz Adrian T.
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Published: Animo Repository 2018
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Online Access:https://animorepository.dlsu.edu.ph/faculty_research/2855
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Institution: De La Salle University
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spelling oai:animorepository.dlsu.edu.ph:faculty_research-38542021-11-17T08:58:02Z Physician quality and payment schemes: A theoretical and empirical analysis Calub, Renz Adrian T. Physicians are expected to provide the best healthcare to their patients; however, it cannot be discounted that their practice is driven primarily by incentives. In this paper, a physician utility maximization model that links physician quality of service to compensation schemes was constructed. Results showed that relative to fixed payment, fee-for-service and mixed payment yield higher quality. Multinomial treatment effects regression of vignette scores on payment schemes also support this hypothesis, indicating that physicians are still below the best level of quality and that incentives to improve are still present. © 2018 by De La Salle University. 2018-07-01T07:00:00Z text https://animorepository.dlsu.edu.ph/faculty_research/2855 Faculty Research Work Animo Repository Physicians—Rating of Physicians—Salaries, etc. Economics
institution De La Salle University
building De La Salle University Library
continent Asia
country Philippines
Philippines
content_provider De La Salle University Library
collection DLSU Institutional Repository
topic Physicians—Rating of
Physicians—Salaries, etc.
Economics
spellingShingle Physicians—Rating of
Physicians—Salaries, etc.
Economics
Calub, Renz Adrian T.
Physician quality and payment schemes: A theoretical and empirical analysis
description Physicians are expected to provide the best healthcare to their patients; however, it cannot be discounted that their practice is driven primarily by incentives. In this paper, a physician utility maximization model that links physician quality of service to compensation schemes was constructed. Results showed that relative to fixed payment, fee-for-service and mixed payment yield higher quality. Multinomial treatment effects regression of vignette scores on payment schemes also support this hypothesis, indicating that physicians are still below the best level of quality and that incentives to improve are still present. © 2018 by De La Salle University.
format text
author Calub, Renz Adrian T.
author_facet Calub, Renz Adrian T.
author_sort Calub, Renz Adrian T.
title Physician quality and payment schemes: A theoretical and empirical analysis
title_short Physician quality and payment schemes: A theoretical and empirical analysis
title_full Physician quality and payment schemes: A theoretical and empirical analysis
title_fullStr Physician quality and payment schemes: A theoretical and empirical analysis
title_full_unstemmed Physician quality and payment schemes: A theoretical and empirical analysis
title_sort physician quality and payment schemes: a theoretical and empirical analysis
publisher Animo Repository
publishDate 2018
url https://animorepository.dlsu.edu.ph/faculty_research/2855
_version_ 1781418123755257856