Optimal hackback
Professor Jay Kesan from the University of Illinois College of Law, in joint work with Ruperto Majuca of the University of Illinois Department of Economics, argue in favor of legal rules that allow “hacking [data] back" in certain business circumstances. They analyze the strategic interaction b...
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| Main Authors: | , |
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| Format: | text |
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Animo Repository
2010
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| Online Access: | https://animorepository.dlsu.edu.ph/faculty_research/8000 |
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| Institution: | De La Salle University |
| Summary: | Professor Jay Kesan from the University of Illinois College of Law, in joint work with Ruperto Majuca of the University of Illinois Department of Economics, argue in favor of legal rules that allow “hacking
[data] back" in certain business circumstances. They analyze the strategic interaction between the hack
and the attacked company or individual and conclude that neither total prohibition nor unrestrained
permission of hack-back is optimal. Instead, they argue that when other alternatives such as criminal
enforcement and litigation are ineffective, self-defense is the best response to cybercrime because there is, a high likelihood of correctly attacking the criminal, and the mitigation of damages to the hacked victim’s systems may outweigh the potential damages to third parties during the hack-back. In addition, the law should require that counterstrikers use only the requisite measures that arc necessary to avoid damages of third parties in their decision-making. Finally, better and ever-improving intrusion detection systems (IDS) and traceback technology improve the deterrent effect and efficiency of hack-bad. |
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