Access control via coalitional power game

This paper considers the problem of access control in the uplink transmission of an OFDMA femtocell network. An underlying noncooperative power game has been devised, based on which a coalition game is formulated by taking a suitable value function. Only two complementary coalitions are allowed to e...

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Main Authors: Guruacharya, Sudarshan, Niyato, Dusit, Kim, Dong In
其他作者: School of Computer Engineering
格式: Conference or Workshop Item
語言:English
出版: 2013
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在線閱讀:https://hdl.handle.net/10356/100177
http://hdl.handle.net/10220/16478
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spelling sg-ntu-dr.10356-1001772020-05-28T07:17:15Z Access control via coalitional power game Guruacharya, Sudarshan Niyato, Dusit Kim, Dong In School of Computer Engineering IEEE Wireless Communications and Networking Conference (2012 : Shanghai, China) DRNTU::Engineering::Computer science and engineering This paper considers the problem of access control in the uplink transmission of an OFDMA femtocell network. An underlying noncooperative power game has been devised, based on which a coalition game is formulated by taking a suitable value function. Only two complementary coalitions are allowed to exist in order to reflect the set of transmitters connected to either the macro base station or the femto access point. The transmitters in the same coalition cooperate by operating on non-interfering subchannels, while those in the complementary coalition are assumed to operate so as to cause maximum jamming. The value of a coalition is obtained as the max-min of utility sum of each individual in the given coalition. In the process, we also examine the optimal jamming strategy of the complementary coalition. Finally, we argue that the obtained value function cannot be super-additive. Since the super-additivity property is required for some of the solutions of cooperative game theory, we resort to the Shapley value solution, for which the super-additivity need not hold, to allocate the payoff to each user in a given coalition. Assuming that the transmitters want to be in the coalition that maximizes their payoff, we form a Markov model to obtain the stable coalition structure. We take these stable coalition structures as the required solution of our access control problem. 2013-10-14T06:30:45Z 2019-12-06T20:17:53Z 2013-10-14T06:30:45Z 2019-12-06T20:17:53Z 2012 2012 Conference Paper Guruacharya, S., Niyato, D., & Kim, D. (2012). Access control via coalitional power game. 2012 IEEE Wireless Communications and Networking Conference (WCNC), pp.2824-2828. https://hdl.handle.net/10356/100177 http://hdl.handle.net/10220/16478 10.1109/WCNC.2012.6214282 en © 2012 IEEE
institution Nanyang Technological University
building NTU Library
country Singapore
collection DR-NTU
language English
topic DRNTU::Engineering::Computer science and engineering
spellingShingle DRNTU::Engineering::Computer science and engineering
Guruacharya, Sudarshan
Niyato, Dusit
Kim, Dong In
Access control via coalitional power game
description This paper considers the problem of access control in the uplink transmission of an OFDMA femtocell network. An underlying noncooperative power game has been devised, based on which a coalition game is formulated by taking a suitable value function. Only two complementary coalitions are allowed to exist in order to reflect the set of transmitters connected to either the macro base station or the femto access point. The transmitters in the same coalition cooperate by operating on non-interfering subchannels, while those in the complementary coalition are assumed to operate so as to cause maximum jamming. The value of a coalition is obtained as the max-min of utility sum of each individual in the given coalition. In the process, we also examine the optimal jamming strategy of the complementary coalition. Finally, we argue that the obtained value function cannot be super-additive. Since the super-additivity property is required for some of the solutions of cooperative game theory, we resort to the Shapley value solution, for which the super-additivity need not hold, to allocate the payoff to each user in a given coalition. Assuming that the transmitters want to be in the coalition that maximizes their payoff, we form a Markov model to obtain the stable coalition structure. We take these stable coalition structures as the required solution of our access control problem.
author2 School of Computer Engineering
author_facet School of Computer Engineering
Guruacharya, Sudarshan
Niyato, Dusit
Kim, Dong In
format Conference or Workshop Item
author Guruacharya, Sudarshan
Niyato, Dusit
Kim, Dong In
author_sort Guruacharya, Sudarshan
title Access control via coalitional power game
title_short Access control via coalitional power game
title_full Access control via coalitional power game
title_fullStr Access control via coalitional power game
title_full_unstemmed Access control via coalitional power game
title_sort access control via coalitional power game
publishDate 2013
url https://hdl.handle.net/10356/100177
http://hdl.handle.net/10220/16478
_version_ 1681057010070585344