Limits of coercive isolation : rethink strategy on North Korea and Iran
Coercive diplomacy has failed to compel North Korea to give up its nuclear weapons programme and failed to deter Iran advancing its own. Isolating these two target states further will not succeed because isolation increases their incentives to rely on nuclear deterrence for national security.
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Main Author: | Timothy W. Crawford |
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Other Authors: | S. Rajaratnam School of International Studies |
Format: | Commentary |
Language: | English |
Published: |
2014
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Subjects: | |
Online Access: | https://hdl.handle.net/10356/104340 http://hdl.handle.net/10220/20161 |
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Institution: | Nanyang Technological University |
Language: | English |
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