Breaking redundancy-based countermeasures with random faults and power side channel

• المؤلفون الرئيسيون: Saha, Sayandeep, Jap, Dirmanto, Breier, Jakub, Bhasin, Shivam, Mukhopadhyay, Debdeep, Dasgupta, Pallab
• مؤلفون آخرون: 2018 Workshop on Fault Diagnosis and Tolerance in Cryptography (FDTC)
• التنسيق: Conference or Workshop Item
• اللغة: English
• منشور في: 2019
• الموضوعات: Engineering::Computer science and engineering; Fault Attack; Side-Channel
• الوصول للمادة أونلاين: https://hdl.handle.net/10356/104811; http://hdl.handle.net/10220/49291
• المؤسسة: Nanyang Technological University

Redundancy based countermeasures against fault attacks are a popular choice in security-critical commercial products, owing to its high fault coverage and applications to safety/reliability. In this paper, we propose a combined attack on such countermeasures. The attack assumes a random byte/nibble fault model with existence of side-channel leakage of the final comparison, and no knowledge of the faulty ciphertext. Unlike the previously proposed biased/multiple fault attack, we just need to corrupt one computation branch. Both analytical and experimental evaluation of this attack strategy is presented on software implementations of two state-of-the-art block ciphers, AES and PRESENT, on an ATmega328P microcontroller, via side-channel measurements and a laser-based fault injection. Moreover, this work establishes that even without the knowledge of the faulty ciphertexts, one can still perform differential fault analysis attacks, given the availability of side-channel information.