A cluster-based distributed active current sensing circuit for hardware Trojan detection

The globalization of integrated circuits (ICs) design and fabrication has given rise to severe concerns on the devastating impact of subverted chip supply. Hardware Trojan (HT) is among the most dangerous threats to defend. The dormant circuit inserted stealthily into the chip by the advisory could...

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Main Authors: Cao, Yuan, Chang, Chip-Hong, Chen, Shoushun
Other Authors: School of Electrical and Electronic Engineering
Format: Article
Language:English
Published: 2015
Subjects:
Online Access:https://hdl.handle.net/10356/105037
http://hdl.handle.net/10220/25186
http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/TIFS.2014.2360432
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Institution: Nanyang Technological University
Language: English
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spelling sg-ntu-dr.10356-1050372019-12-06T21:44:53Z A cluster-based distributed active current sensing circuit for hardware Trojan detection Cao, Yuan Chang, Chip-Hong Chen, Shoushun School of Electrical and Electronic Engineering DRNTU::Engineering::Electrical and electronic engineering The globalization of integrated circuits (ICs) design and fabrication has given rise to severe concerns on the devastating impact of subverted chip supply. Hardware Trojan (HT) is among the most dangerous threats to defend. The dormant circuit inserted stealthily into the chip by the advisory could steal the confidential information or paralyze the system connected to the subverted chip upon the HT activation. This paper presents a transient power supply current sensor to facilitate the screening of an IC for HT infection. Based on the power gating scheme, it converts the current activity on local power grid into a timing pulse from which the timing and power-related side channel signals can be externally monitored by the existing scan test architecture. Its current comparator threshold can be calibrated against the quiescent current noise floor to reduce the impacts of process variations. Postlayout statistical simulations of process variations are performed on the ISCAS'85 benchmark circuits to demonstrate the effectiveness of the proposed technique for the detection of delay-invariant and rarely switched HTs. Compared with the detection error rate of a 4-bit counter-based HT reported by an existing HT detection method using the path delay fingerprint, our method shows an order of magnitude improvement in the detection accuracy. Accepted version 2015-03-09T02:34:32Z 2019-12-06T21:44:53Z 2015-03-09T02:34:32Z 2019-12-06T21:44:53Z 2013 2013 Journal Article Cao, Y., Chang, C.-H., & Chen, S. (2014). A cluster-based distributed active current sensing circuit for hardware Trojan detection. IEEE transactions on information forensics and security, 9(12), 2220-2231. 1556-6013 https://hdl.handle.net/10356/105037 http://hdl.handle.net/10220/25186 http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/TIFS.2014.2360432 183011 en IEEE transactions on information forensics and security © 2013 IEEE. Personal use of this material is permitted. Permission from IEEE must be obtained for all other uses, in any current or future media, including reprinting/republishing this material for advertising or promotional purposes, creating new collective works, for resale or redistribution to servers or lists, or reuse of any copyrighted component of this work in other works. The published version is available at: [http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/TIFS.2014.2360432]. application/pdf
institution Nanyang Technological University
building NTU Library
country Singapore
collection DR-NTU
language English
topic DRNTU::Engineering::Electrical and electronic engineering
spellingShingle DRNTU::Engineering::Electrical and electronic engineering
Cao, Yuan
Chang, Chip-Hong
Chen, Shoushun
A cluster-based distributed active current sensing circuit for hardware Trojan detection
description The globalization of integrated circuits (ICs) design and fabrication has given rise to severe concerns on the devastating impact of subverted chip supply. Hardware Trojan (HT) is among the most dangerous threats to defend. The dormant circuit inserted stealthily into the chip by the advisory could steal the confidential information or paralyze the system connected to the subverted chip upon the HT activation. This paper presents a transient power supply current sensor to facilitate the screening of an IC for HT infection. Based on the power gating scheme, it converts the current activity on local power grid into a timing pulse from which the timing and power-related side channel signals can be externally monitored by the existing scan test architecture. Its current comparator threshold can be calibrated against the quiescent current noise floor to reduce the impacts of process variations. Postlayout statistical simulations of process variations are performed on the ISCAS'85 benchmark circuits to demonstrate the effectiveness of the proposed technique for the detection of delay-invariant and rarely switched HTs. Compared with the detection error rate of a 4-bit counter-based HT reported by an existing HT detection method using the path delay fingerprint, our method shows an order of magnitude improvement in the detection accuracy.
author2 School of Electrical and Electronic Engineering
author_facet School of Electrical and Electronic Engineering
Cao, Yuan
Chang, Chip-Hong
Chen, Shoushun
format Article
author Cao, Yuan
Chang, Chip-Hong
Chen, Shoushun
author_sort Cao, Yuan
title A cluster-based distributed active current sensing circuit for hardware Trojan detection
title_short A cluster-based distributed active current sensing circuit for hardware Trojan detection
title_full A cluster-based distributed active current sensing circuit for hardware Trojan detection
title_fullStr A cluster-based distributed active current sensing circuit for hardware Trojan detection
title_full_unstemmed A cluster-based distributed active current sensing circuit for hardware Trojan detection
title_sort cluster-based distributed active current sensing circuit for hardware trojan detection
publishDate 2015
url https://hdl.handle.net/10356/105037
http://hdl.handle.net/10220/25186
http://dx.doi.org/10.1109/TIFS.2014.2360432
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