Comparative advantage and strategic specialization
This paper shows that a strong comparative advantage is necessary for free trade and specialization in a 2 × 2 symmetric Ricardian model to be achieved in a Nash equilibrium. Governments strategically control labor distribution across industries, and representative agents maximize Cobb–Douglas utili...
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| 格式: | Article |
| 語言: | English |
| 出版: |
2019
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| 在線閱讀: | https://hdl.handle.net/10356/105738 http://hdl.handle.net/10220/48741 http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/roie.12300 |
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