Comparative advantage and strategic specialization
This paper shows that a strong comparative advantage is necessary for free trade and specialization in a 2 × 2 symmetric Ricardian model to be achieved in a Nash equilibrium. Governments strategically control labor distribution across industries, and representative agents maximize Cobb–Douglas utili...
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Main Author: | Kang, Minwook |
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Other Authors: | School of Social Sciences |
Format: | Article |
Language: | English |
Published: |
2019
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Subjects: | |
Online Access: | https://hdl.handle.net/10356/105738 http://hdl.handle.net/10220/48741 http://dx.doi.org/10.1111/roie.12300 |
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Institution: | Nanyang Technological University |
Language: | English |
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