Do analysts matter for governance? Evidence from natural experiments
Building on two sources of exogenous shocks to analyst coverage (broker closures and mergers), we explore the causal effects of analyst coverage on mitigating managerial expropriation of outside shareholders. We find that as a firm experiences an exogenous decrease in analyst coverage, shareholders...
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Main Authors: | Chen, Jonas Tao, Harford, Jarrad, Lin, Chen |
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Other Authors: | Nanyang Business School |
Format: | Article |
Language: | English |
Published: |
2015
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Subjects: | |
Online Access: | https://hdl.handle.net/10356/106948 http://hdl.handle.net/10220/25250 |
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Institution: | Nanyang Technological University |
Language: | English |
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